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Abstract
This paper analyzes the interaction between migration of high-skilled labor and
publicly nanced investment. We develop a theoretical model with multiple, ex
ante identical jurisdictions where individuals decide on education and subsequent
emigration. Migration decisions are based on di¤erences in net income across
jurisdictions which endogenously may occur. The interaction between income dif-
ferences and migration ows gives rise to the potential of multiple equilibria: a
symmetric equilibrium without migration and an asymmetric equilibrium in which
net income levels di¤er among jurisdictions and trigger migration ows. In the
former equilibrium, all jurisdictions have the same public investment level. In the
latter one, public investment is high in host economies of skilled expatriates and
low in source economies. We empirically test the hypothesis that emigration rates
are negatively associated with various kinds of publicly nanced investment levels
for OECD countries.
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1 Introduction
Governments have become increasingly aware of international factor mobility when de-
signing public policy. In recent times movements of workers with high education levels
have provoked an intensive debate among policymakers in advanced countries (e.g. Con-
gressional Budget O¢ ce, 2005; Council of Europe, 1995; European Commission, 2003,
2007). Anglo-Saxon countries have developed successful strategies to attract high-skilled
labor,1 while many other regions, even advanced countries in Europe, su¤er from signif-
icant brain drain. For instance, the stock of expatriates of the tertiary educated from
Finland, Portugal and Italy around the year 2000 amounted to a non-negligible gure
of 7.2, 18.9 and 9.6 percent of educated residents, respectively (Doquier and Marfouk,
2006). Among French, Spanish and Italian expatriates arriving in the US between 1990
and 2000 around 9 percent held a Ph.D (Saint-Paul, 2004).
This paper examines the relationship between migration of skilled labor and public
investment expenditure. The particular interest in this link stems from the empirically
well-supported notion that brain drain is largely triggered by low earning prospects at
home, and may further reduce income levels, whereas publicly nanced investments may
increase output capacity and therefore boost economic prosperity. Prima facie, one may
therefore suspect that economies experiencing outows of skilled labor are particularly
prone to invest in public infrastructure in order to mitigate or reverse brain drain.
However, a rst look at the data reveals that public investment levels in countries
which benet from high net immigration such as the US and Switzerland are compara-
tively high, whereas public investment in countries which su¤er from high net emigration
like Portugal and Mexico is comparatively low. In fact, as Figure 1a shows, in the year
2000, net emigration rates of the tertiary educated are negatively related to (log) per
capita public investment levels among OECD countries. Figure 1b considers the rela-
tionship of the changes of the two variables between 1990 and 2000 in order to net out
omitted variables which are constant over time. It again suggests a negative relationship,
1According to Doquier and Marfouk (2006), almost 4/5 of the over 20 million tertiary educated
migrants lived in Anglo-Saxon countries in the year 2000. 11.7 percent of all doctorate holders in the
US were foreign citizens in 2004 and 25.7 percent of the doctorate holders (368,800 people) were foreign
born (Auriol, 2007).
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which means that a larger migration outow is associated with slower growth of public
investment expenditure.
<Figure 1>
To understand these empirical patterns, we develop a theoretical model with many ex
ante identical jurisdictions. We examine how migration ows interact with public invest-
ment levels set by benevolent policymakers. Source and host economies of high-skilled
expatriates can endogenously emerge despite symmetry ex ante, which has implications
for the pattern of public investment choices. There are three key features of the model.
First, migration decisions are based on di¤erences in net wage rates for the skilled across
jurisdictions.2 The possibility of migration is taken into account when the education
decision is made. Second, not only do income di¤erences trigger migration outows,
but also does higher emigration raise income gaps to host economies of skilled expatri-
ates. This is implied by assuming human capital externalities on productivity like in
Lucas (1988). Such externalities give rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria: that
is, in addition to an equilibrium without migration, there may be migration ows be-
tween ex ante identical economies. Third, we assume that higher public investments are
productivity-enhancing and thus raise income per capita.
We show that, as a consequence of these basic premises and consistent with Figure
1, it is optimal for host economies to have higher public investment levels than source
economies. Interestingly, according to our model, welfare-maximization is equivalent
to minimization of brain drain in a source economy. Our analysis therefore suggests
that it is optimal for source economies to adjust the public investment level in order to
mitigate the brain drain problem. However, it is a low rather than a high spending level,
compared to host economies, which achieves this goal. In host economies it is optimal to
set public investment expenditure at a level which maximizes the number of high-skilled
immigrants.
In order to establish that the relationships in Figure 1 represent causal e¤ects, in our
empirical analysis, we construct an instrument for the aggregate net emigration rate of a
2See Beine, Doquier and Ozden (2008) and Grogger and Hanson (2008) for recent empirical support.
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countrys skilled workers. The instrumentation strategy is motivated by the innovative
way to predict of aggregate trade ows in the widely cited contribution of Frankel and
Romer (1999) on the e¤ects of trade on growth. We regress bilateral emigration stocks
of tertiary educated workers on several presumably exogenous factors (like the distance
between countries). We then use the predicted bilateral stocks to construct an aggregate
net emigration rate for each country. The instrumental variable (IV) estimates largely
conrm results from OLS estimations.
Our contribution shares several features with the previous literature. For instance,
as in our model, Miyagiwa (1991) and Grossmann and Stadelmann (2008) allow for so-
cially increasing returns to scale. Emigration therefore potentially reduces wages for the
skilled. However, these studies assume that income of the host economy is exogenous. In
our framework, both emigration patterns and income levels are fully endogenous. This
enables us to derive asymmetry of ex ante identical economies as a result of increasing
returns. Second, similar to seminal papers like Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), albeit for
di¤erent reasons, our framework emphasizes adverse e¤ects of outward migration (and
benecial ones for host economies). This is not to deny the possibility of potentially bene-
cial e¤ects of emigration for source economies. These may arise in low-income countries
from higher incentives to acquire human capital as response to higher immigration quo-
tas in rich countries (e.g., Mountford, 1997; Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz, 1997,
1998; Beine, Doquier and Rapoport, 2001). However, empirically, this mechanism is
supported only for poor countries with rather low levels of human capital (Beine, Do-
quier and Rapoport, 2001, 2008). We instead focus on ex ante similar economies in the
theoretical part and provide evidence for OECD countries, where positive e¤ects of brain
drain are unlikely to occur. Finally, our research is related to the by now large literature
on the consequences of high-skilled labor mobility on the public sector. Many studies
focussed on the positive and normative implications of brain drain for the tax system
(e.g. Bhagwati and Wilson, 1989; Wildasin, 2000; Andersson and Konrad, 2003; Bucov-
etsky, 2003; Wilson, 2008). Other contributions dealt with the implications of declining
mobility costs for public education nance (see e.g. Justman and Thisse, 1997, 2000;
Poutvaara, 2004, 2008; Egger, Falkinger and Grossmann, 2007). Our paper has a di¤er-
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ent focus. Rather than analyzing scal competition or socially desirable taxation,3 we
develop the theoretical hypothesis that a negative relationship between high-skilled em-
igration and productive government spending endogenously arises and present empirical
support for it.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section
3 rst derives the equilibrium level of migration in an economy as a function of its public
investment level and of net income levels abroad. It then examines the international equi-
librium, by highlighting the role of expectations for the equilibrium outcome. There we
focus on the scenario where jurisdictions optimally choose their public investment levels.
Section 4 presents empirical evidence on the predicted relationship between migration
patterns and public investment levels by distinguishing various categories of potentially
productivity-enhancing public expenditures. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a continuum of ex ante identical jurisdictions with unit mass. Each jurisdiction
is initially populated by a unit mass of natives. There is perfect competition in goods
and labor markets.
In each jurisdiction, there is a representative rm which produces a homogenous
consumption good, chosen as numeraire. Output Y is given by the linearly homogenous
function F , specied in CES-form:
Y = F (X;L) = A 

X
 1
 + (1  )L 1
 
 1
; (1)
 > 0, 0 <  < 1, where L is employment of low-skilled labor and X is the input of an
intermediate capital good. Total factor productivity (TFP), A, depends on the number
3Technically, we abstract from scal competition by assuming that jusrisdictions are small and do
not strategically interact.
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of high-skilled workers, N , in the economy.4 We have
A = a(N); (2)
where a() is an increasing and concave function with a(0)  0. Thus, a reduction in
the skilled labor force, as result of emigration, reduces output for given input levels.5
A is taken as given by the representative rm. Our formulation thus captures human
capital externalities on productivity like in Lucas (1988); there are socially increasing
but privately constant returns to scale.
Production of the intermediate good is skill-intensive. For simplicity it only uses
high-skilled labor. Output is given by
X = B  S; (3)
where S denotes the amount of high-skilled labor and B measures its productivity.
Productivity is a¤ected by the public investment level of a jurisdiction, G, measured
in units of the nal good. We assume
B = b(G); (4)
where b() is an increasing and concave function with b(0) > 0; moreover, we assume
limG!0 b0(G) ! 1 and limG!1 b0(G) = 0.6 According to (4), public investment G is a
local public good (i.e., there are no spillovers to other jurisdictions).
Public investment is nanced by proportional wage taxation. The tax rate is denoted
by  2 (0; 1). It applies to all workers employed in the domestic economy (natives and
immigrants, but not emigrants).7
4Such scale e¤ectdoes not necessarily mean that more largely populated economies are richer than
small ones. What may matter for TFP is the density of the skilled population in an economy rather
than its size. Normalizing the area of a jurisdiction to unity gives equivalently rise to formulation (2).
5In Grossmann and Stadelmann (2008), a similar property arises from a monopolistic competition
model with endogenous R&D investment decisions of intermediate good rms.
6The boundary conditions ensure an interior solution for the optimal choice of G of local governments.
7The assumption is made for concreteness. Results would be unchanged if immigrants were not be
obliged to pay taxes or if emigrants still had to pay taxes at home, as will become apparent.
6
Individuals are endowed with one unit of time. They decide whether or not to
become high-skilled, at cost of e 2 (0; 1) units of time. If not spending time e in school,
an individual remains low-skilled. Time not used for education is inelastically supplied
to a perfect labor market.
Utility of individual i is given by his/her consumption level (equal to after-tax wage
income) c(i) of the nal good when working at home. If the individual works abroad,
utility is a discounted measure compared to that of non-migrants; formally, utility is given
by c(i)=(1 + (i)).8 Mobility cost parameter  is distributed according to a continuous
p.d.f. '() with positive support; the corresponding c.d.f. is denoted by (). There are
no immigration quotas. When deciding whether or not to become skilled, individuals
take both migration incentives and costs into account. In order to focus on migration
patterns of high-skilled workers, as common in the brain drain literature, we assume that
low-skilled labor is immobile.9
We close the model description with a remark on the role of public investment, G,
for economic performance of a jurisdiction. Rather than assuming that an increase in
G raises productivity in the intermediate goods sector, and thus is high-skilled labor
saving, one may alternatively assume that TFP A in the nal goods sector is positively
a¤ected by a higher G. It is easy to show that in this case, an increase in G would leave
the educational choice una¤ected. In contrast, in our formulation public investment will
generally a¤ect education decisions. Using (3) in (1) we see that  equals the elasticity
of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labor. Empirical evidence suggests
 > 1 (e.g. Johnson, 1997; Card, 2009). As will become apparent, in this case an
increase in G induces more individuals to become educated. This result is consistent
with empirical evidence in the case of public education spending (e.g. Egger, Egger,
Falkinger and Grossmann, 2009).
8See Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997), among others
9This could be justied by the fact that workers with lower education levels often face severe insti-
tutional migration barriers in potential host economies. Moreover, the low-skilled may be more likely
to have di¢ culties in nding a job, learning a foreign language and integrating in the foreign society.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we rst analyze the education and migration decision in a single juris-
diction for a given public investment level and given the income opportunities abroad
(small open economy). We then examine the international equilibrium where in all juris-
dictions income levels and migration ows are endogenous and public investment levels
are optimally chosen.
3.1 Small Open Economy
We start by deriving wage rates for high- and low-skilled labor, denoted by wS and wL,
respectively. The wage rate per unit of high-skilled labor is given by its marginal revenue
product in the intermediate goods sector, wS = pB, where p denotes the price of the
intermediate good. Price p is equal to the marginal product in the nal goods sector
(inverse demand for the intermediate good), p = @Y=@X. Consequently, we nd
wS = A
 
B 1 + (1  ) 1B ( 1)
2


L
S
 1

! 1
 1
; (5)
according to (1) and (3). Moreover, combining wS = B  (@Y=@X) with wL = @Y=@L
and using X = BS; we nd
wS
wL
=

1  B
 1


L
S
 1

: (6)
for the relative wage rate.
In an equilibrium where at least some skilled natives remain in the domestic economy,
individuals (which are ex ante identical) must be indi¤erent whether or not to acquire
education. Thus, in view of time cost e, the no arbitrage condition
(1  e)wS = wL (7)
must hold. Combining (6) and (7), we nd that the ratio of low-skilled to high-skilled
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units of labor is given by
L
S
=

1  
(1  e)

B1 . (8)
Substituting (8) into (5) leads to
wS = A

B 1 + (1  ) (1  e)1  1 1 : (9)
Thus, the wage rate per unit of high-skilled labor, wS, is increasing in B. For later use,
also note that in the case where   2, wS is concave as a function of B.
We next derive the number of non-migrating high-skilled workers, N , whenm workers
migrate. High-skilled labor input at home is given by S = (1   e)N . Combining this
with (8), we obtain L =

1 
(1 e)

B1 (1  e)N . Substituting the latter expression into
resource constraint N +m+ L = 1 and solving for N leads to
N =
1 m
1 +
 
1 


[(1  e)B]1  : (10)
Hence, under optimal education decisions, an increase in the number of emigrants m
lowers the number of high-skilled workers remaining in the economy, whereas the total
number of natives who choose to acquire education, N + m, rises. Moreover, higher
productivity B = b(G), which may be triggered by an increase in the public investment
level, G, raises the number of high-skilled workers in the domestic economy, N , if and
only if  > 1. As pointed out at the end of section 2,  > 1 is the empirically relevant
case. Also note that in the case where   2, N is strictly concave as a function of B.
Throughout we maintain the assumption
1 <   2; (A1)
which corresponds to the range for the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and
low-skilled labor found in the literature.
9
Combining A = a(N) with (10) and substituting into (9) leads to
wS = a
 
1 m
1 +
 
1 


[(1  e)B]1 
!
B 1 + (1  ) (1  e)1  1 1  ~wS(B;m):
(11)
Hence, ~wS(B;m) is increasing and strictly concave as a function of B under assumption
A1 ( ~wSB > 0, ~w
S
BB < 0).  > 1 is also su¢ cient (but not necessary) for the cross-
derivative of ~wS to be negative ( ~wSBm < 0). This will turn out to be a key property
of the model. It may be understood as follows: Due to human capital externalities,
higher emigration lowers TFP and therefore reduces wage rates; in particular, ~wSm < 0.
The decline in TFP lowers the marginal product of the intermediate good in nal goods
production; thus, an increase in the productivity of skilled labor B has a lower impact
on wage rates if m increases. As B is positively a¤ected by a higher public investment
level G, this implies that an increase in G has a lower impact on wage rates, if more
skilled workers emigrate.
We now turn to the migration decision. Let the highest net wage rate per unit of
high-skilled labor among jurisdictions abroad be given by wSnet. For the purpose of this
subsection, we treat wSnet as exogenous whereas in an international equilibrium analyzed
below, wages everywhere are a¤ected by migration ows.
In view of disutility from emigrating for a given consumption level, individual i
emigrates if
wSnet
wSnet
 1 + (i); (12)
where wSnet  (1   )wS is the after-tax wage rate of skilled labor in the considered
economy. Thus, if wSnet < w
S
net, the number of emigrants is
m =
wSnet=w
S
net 1R
0
'()d = ( wSnet=w
S
net   1): (13)
From the government budget constraint,  [wS(1  e)N + wLL] = G. Employing no
arbitrage condition (1  e)wS = wL and resource constraint N +L = 1 m, we nd that
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wS =
G
(1 m)(1 e) . Thus, we have
wSnet = w
S   wS = ~wS(b(G);m)  G
(1 m)(1  e)  W (G;m). (14)
From the properties of (11) and function b, the net wage rate wSnet = W (G;m) is decreas-
ing in the number of emigrants m, for two reasons. The rst reason is that an increase in
m lowers TFP, as discussed above. The second reason is that higher emigration reduces
the tax base, which means that for a given public investment level G, the tax rate 
has to increase in order to balance the government budget. Both e¤ects go in the same
direction. If we alternatively assumed that emigrants still pay taxes where they are born,
such that the second e¤ects would vanish, Wm < 0 would still hold.
There are two further interesting properties of function W , which give rise to our
main results, as will become apparent. First, under assumption A1, after-tax wages are
strictly concave as a function of G, WGG < 0.10 Second, the e¤ect of an increase in G
on wages is smaller, if emigration is higher; formally, WGm < 0. The property also arises
for two reasons: First, as discussed, pre-tax wage rates are rising less as a response of
an increase in productivity parameter B when m increases (recall ~wSBm < 0). Moreover,
it holds that the additional tax burden of an increase in G is higher, if emigration rises.
Again the second e¤ect would vanish if emigrants still paid taxes in the economy where
they are born.
According to (13), if wSnet  W (G;m), the number of emigrants m  0 is implicitly
given by
m = 

wSnet
W (G;m)
  1

 RHS: (15)
Figure 2 depicts the right-hand side, RHS, of (15), as a (S-shaped) function of m (given
wSnet and G). An equilibrium is reached if RHS intersects with the 45-degree line. Figure
2 shows three equilibria, with migration levels denoted by m0, mand m1. Multiple
equilibria easily arise due to the following interaction: on the one hand, (after-tax)
income di¤erences trigger migration ows. On the other hand, higher emigration triggers
income reductions in the source economy, due to negative human capital externalities of
10Recall that ~wSBB < 0 and b
00  0.
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brain drain; this gives further incentives to emigrate. Consequently, either emigration
and the wage gap to the exogenous level wSnet are high or both are low. Figure 2 is drawn
in such a way that at m0 = 0 (no emigration or immigration in the considered economy)
the net wage rate is the same as the highest one abroad, W (G; 0) = wSnet. The two other
equilibria in Figure 2, mand m1, feature emigration.
<Figure 2>
Throughout, we invoke the standard notion of tâtonnement stability; here, this means
that we focus on migration levels where small perturbations of an equilibrium gives rise
to a tendency of m to return to its initial level. In Figure 2, this is the case when RHS
crosses the 45-degree line from above (i.e., @RHS=@m < 1). Thus, m0 = 0 and m1
are stable equilibrium migration levels, whereas at mthe equilibrium is unstable. For
instance, suppose that the number of emigrants m would be slightly below m1. In this
case, RHS > m, implying that emigration tends to rise. If to the contrary the number
of emigrants m is slightly higher than m1, then RHS < m and the number of migrants
tends to fall. The opposite holds at m.
3.2 International Equilibrium
We now turn to the international equilibrium, where all income levels are endogenous.
Such an equilibrium could be analyzed for any given distribution of (local) public invest-
ment levels in the world economy. We focus on the particular case where all jurisdictions
choose their public investment levels optimally.11 As we are interested in the rela-
tionship between public investment and the pattern of migration, we need a plausible
government objective function. In our context, with ex ante identical individuals, a
plausible candidate is the utility of non-migrating individuals. These most plausibly
represent the median voter. For a jurisdiction which does not expect to have immi-
gration, m  0, this means that net wage rate W (G;m) is maximized subject to the
11Although this may not literally be the case, focussing on optimal choices is meaningful to explain
empirical evidence if the basic economic trade-o¤s faced by governments, which we identify here, are
taken into account in real life.
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education and migration decisions as reected by (15). The after-tax wage rates abroad
are taken as given.12
So far we focused on emigration. Regarding immigration, suppose a jurisdiction ex-
pecting an inow of skilled workers takes into account that the number of immigrants, I,
depends on the domestic net wage rate of high-skilled labor and the income opportunities
of high-skilled labor abroad. Formally, suppose host economies with I > 0 immigrants
take into account schedule I = ~I(wSnet), with ~I
0 > 0 (i.e., higher after-tax wage rates at
home makes host economies more attractive).13 Analogously to the derivation of (14),
it is immediate that wSnet = W (G; I). Thus,
I = ~I(W (G; I)) (16)
implicitly denes the immigration level I as a function of G; we denote this level by
I = I^(G). Fortunately, as will become apparent, we do not have to know functions ~I or
I^ to characterize an international (perfect foresight) equilibrium.
We require the following equilibrium conditions to hold:
 Individuals optimally choose whether to acquire education and whether to migrate
if educated, by taking wage rates at home and abroad as given.
 Representative rms in both the nal goods sector and the intermediate goods
sector maximize prots by taking factor prices as given.
 In all jurisdictions, public investment levels are chosen such that net wage rates of
the non-migrants are maximized, taking into account educational choices, migra-
tion behavior, choices of rms, and taking as given wage rates abroad.
 Migration patterns are tâtonnement-stable.
 The number of immigrants in the world equals the number of emigrants.
12Note that there is no strategic interaction in choosing public investment levels as each jurisdiction
is innitesimally small.
13The immigration level also depends on income opportunities abroad, which are suppressed in the
formal representation.
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We will now show that, despite symmetry of jurisdictions ex ante, there may exist
an equilibrium where there is a group of host economies which have the same immigra-
tion level I and a group of source economies which have the same emigration level m.
Denoting the fraction of host economies by , we then have
I = (1  )m. (17)
What agents take as given must of course be correct ex post. For governments, this
includes the expectation whether to be a host or source economy of migrating workers.
Expectingm = 0, a jurisdiction solvesmaxGW (G; 0). AsWGG < 0, this leads to optimal
public investment level G0 as given by WG(G0; 0) = 0. Moreover, expecting m > 0, a
jurisdiction solves maxGW (G; m^(G)), where m^ denotes the level of emigration which is
implicitly given by (15).14 The rst-order condition reads
WG +Wmm^G = 0: (18)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (15) implies that
m^G(G) =  
'

wSnet
W (G;m^)
  1

wSnet
W (G;m^)2
WG(G; m^)
1  [@RHS=@m]m=m^
: (19)
Thus, under stability (@RHS=@m < 1), the rst order condition (18) can be rewritten
as WG(G; m^(G)) = 0. At the so-dened public investment level, we have m^G = 0,
according to (19). Thus, WGG < 0 is su¢ cient for the second-order condition to hold.
Finally, expecting I = I^(G) > 0, a jurisdiction solves maxGW (G; I^(G)).15 The rst-
order condition reads
WG  WmI^G = 0; (20)
14We suppress argument wSnet in m^.
15Recall that I^ is the level of immigration which is implicitly given by (16).
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where the implicit function theorem implies that
I^G(G) =
~I 0(W (G; I^))WG(G; I^)
1 +
h
~I 0()Wm
i
I=I^
: (21)
Under stability, analogously to (19), the denominator of the right-hand side of (21) is pos-
itive. Thus, the rst order condition (20) for a source economy becomesWG(G; I^(G)) =
0. Again, the second order condition holds.
It is interesting to note that, at the optimal public investment levels, emigration is
minimized in a source economy of high-skilled expatriates and immigration is maximized
in host economies. To see this formally, note that m^G = 0 if and only if WG = 0 for
source economies. At the so-dened level of G, m^GG > 0, according to (19). Similarly,
I^G = 0 if WG = 0 and I^GG < 0 at that level of G. These results are implied by the
basic properties of the model. Recall that the government objective is to maximize net
wage income of workers at home. Income opportunities abroad relative to those at home
form the basis for migration decisions. Both skilled workers and the government take net
wage rates abroad as given. The government problem and individual migration decisions
are thus based on the same variable, the wage rate for skilled labor at home, wSnet. The
question now is in which way the migration of skilled labor a¤ects public investment
levels.
In equilibrium, the expectation whether to be host or source economy is self-fullling.
Any fraction of host economies  is a potential equilibrium value. For concreteness, we
focus on  = 0:5. According to (17), this implies I = m. Let us denote by G1 and G

2 the
equilibrium public investment level of a source economy and host economy, respectively.
In international equilibrium, the number of migrants in or out of a jurisdiction, m  0,
and investment levels (G1; G

2) are simultaneously given by equation system
WG(G

1;m
) = 0 (22)
WG(G

2; m) = 0; (23)
m = 

W (G2; m)
W (G1;m)
  1

: (24)
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Let us write public investment levels dened by WG(G;m) = 0 and WG(G; m) = 0 as
~G1(m) and ~G2(m), respectively, and dene
M(m)  
 
W ( ~G1(m); m)
W ( ~G2(m);m)
  1
!
[= RHS] : (25)
As follows from the notion of stability of equilibrium emigration, we must have that
M 0(m) < 1 for m  0. Note that M(0) =M 0(0) = 0.
Property M 0(0) < 1 ensures that there exists a symmetric international equilibrium,
in which there is no migration (m = 0) and all jurisdictions choose public investment level
G0 as dened by WG(G0; 0) = 0. Moreover, there may be an asymmetric equilibrium
with m > 0 (like m1 in Figure 2), such that (22)-(24) and M 0(m) < 1 holds. The key
characteristic of this equilibrium is that G1 < G

2; that is, source economies have a lower
public investment level than host economies. This important result follows from property
WGm < 0 and the denition of ~G1(m) and ~G2(m), respectively; that is, ~G01(m) < 0 and
~G02(m) > 0. Because the marginal impact of increasing the public investment level on the
utility of non-migrants decreases with higher brain drain and increases when more skilled
workers immigrate, the analysis suggests a negative relationship between net emigration
of an economy and its public investment level.
4 Empirical Support
The theoretical analysis suggests three main hypotheses. First, emigration incentives de-
pend on relative income to potential destination economies. The prediction that income
di¤erences trigger migration ows has been examined empirically elsewhere. Recently,
both Beine, Doquier and Ozden (2008) and Grogger and Hanson (2008) provide convinc-
ing evidence for the critical role of wage di¤erences between country pairs on emigration
rates of tertiary educated workers. Second, our increasing returns framework suggests
that there is a feedback mechanism working from higher emigration to lower wage rates
and income levels. Based on an alternative theoretical framework, this prediction is
supported by evidence provided in Grossmann and Stadelmann (2008). Third, and most
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important for the purpose of this study, we have highlighted the interaction between
emigration of high-skilled labor and an economys public investment level. We have
shown that the marginal impact of an increase in public investments on income of do-
mestic workers decreases with higher emigration. The novel hypothesis we explore in this
section thus is that a higher net emigration rate of high-skilled workers in an economy
causes lower public investment levels, all other things equal. We test this prediction by
focussing on OECD countries, for four reasons. First, our model has abstracted from the
possibility that higher emigration may lead to economic gains in source economies, as
discussed in the introduction (e.g. Mountford, 1997, among others). Such e¤ects seem
empirically relevant in poor countries, but not in advanced economies. Second, we want
to avoid large institutional di¤erences of countries in our data set. Third, data from
OECD countries typically are of better quality and more comparable across countries.
Fourth, and maybe most important, according to our theoretical analysis net rather
than gross emigration rates matter for the relation to public investment levels. As will
become apparent, however, for data availability reasons net emigration rates can only
be constructed when restricting attention to OECD countries.
Examining the correlation between public expenditure and emigration cannot identify
the direction of causation between the two. We therefore construct an instrument for net
migration rates of skilled workers and provide instrumental-variable (IV) estimations in
addition to OLS. For this we use a measure of social networks of migrants and exogenous
country characteristics, both potentially a¤ecting mobility costs of individuals, to explain
bilateral migration ows.
4.1 Data and Estimation Strategy
The rst challenge is to nd a measure for the net emigration rate of high-skilled indi-
viduals for OECD countries. Doquier and Marfouk (2006) have established a dataset of
(gross) emigration stocks and rates by educational attainment for the years 1990 and
2000. The authors count as emigrants all foreign-born individuals aged at least 25 who
live in an OECD country and class them by educational attainment and country of origin.
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Thus, only emigration into OECD countries is captured, approximately 90 % of educated
migrants in the world.16 Doquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007) extend the initial dataset
by Doquier and Marfouk (2006) and provide bilateral emigration stocks of high-skilled
persons from country i living in OECD country j, denoted by Mij. Furthermore, let
SAll denote the set of all 195 countries in the data set (each one is a potential source
country) and denote by SOECD the set of OECD countries (only these are potential host
countries).
We construct the net emigration stock of an OECD country j by aggregating its total
emigration stock,
P
i2SOECD
Mji, and deducting its total immigration stock,
P
i2SAll
Mij. The
net emigration stock of OECD country j is denoted by
NetEmigj :=
P
i2SOECD
Mji  
P
i2SAll
Mij: (26)
To adjust the emigration variable for the size of the skilled labor force, we divide the
high-skilled net emigration stock by the stock of skilled residents in country j, Nj, and
thereby obtain a net emigration rate: Migj := NetEmigj=Nj.
Denoting by Gj the public investment level per capita of country j we estimate the
following equation for the year 2000:
logGj = 0 + 1Migj + x
0
jx + "i: (27)
As the theoretical model predicts a negative impact of higher emigration on public
investment, we expect 1 < 0. xj is a vector of other controls potentially a¤ecting
public investment in country j. We include (log) population size in order to control for
economies of scale associated with public goods. That is, if anything, population size
should be negatively related to public expenditure per capita. Moreover, to account
for the age structure of a country, which may a¤ect public investments, we include the
fraction of population under the age of 16. Finally, to deal with spending determinants
which are not based on the optimality criterion employed in the theoretical model, we also
16See Doquier and Marfouk (2006) for a detailed discussion concerning data collection and construction
issues.
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control for social spending per capita. Thereby we want, on the one hand, account for
the possibility that governmentsspending levels on both investment and non-investment
expenditure categories are higher in some countries than in others for ideological reasons.
This would suggest a positive relationship between the government investment and social
spending. On the other hand, governments may substitute public investments for welfare
expenses. This would imply a negative relationship between the two spending categories.
"j is an error term.
We use four di¤erent OECD measures of public expenditure as dependent variable:
government gross xed capital formation, total publicly nanced R&D spending, R&D
spending on higher education, and total public education expenditure (all in logs). The
rst category may be most suited in light of the theoretical model, as it represents
public infrastructure spending. We analyze the e¤ects on this category rst and discuss
the other measures in somewhat less detail.
To mitigate potential omitted variable bias, we also take rst di¤erences of equation
(27) and regress the (approximate) growth rate of public investment per capita in country
j on the change in the emigration rate of skilled migrants between 1990 and 2000:
log(Gj;t=Gj;t 1) = 0 + 1DeltaMigj + z
0
jz + j; (28)
where time indices t and t 1 refer to years 2000 and 1990, respectively, andDeltaMigj :=
Migj;t Migj;t 1. According to the theoretical model, we expect 1 < 0. zj is a vector of
other controls potentially a¤ecting the rate of change of public investment over time. We
include the di¤erence of log population size between 1990 and 2000 and the growth rate
of GDP per capita in that time period as controls. The latter accounts for adjustment
in spending due to business cycle phenomena. j is an error term. The data sources and
summary statistics of the employed variables are presented in Table 1.
< Table 1 >
To deal with potential endogeneity bias regarding the relationships of interest, we
construct an instrument for the net emigration rate of the year 2000 (Migj;t) as well
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as its change between 1990 and 2000 (DeltaMigj) to estimate equations (27) and (28),
respectively. To obtain our instrument for net emigration rates of skilled labor, we
exploit the availability of bilateral migration stocks. The procedure is similar to the
instrumentation strategy to construct aggregate trade ows of a country in the widely-
cited contribution of Frankel and Romer (1999) on the impact of higher trade ows on
income per capita. Instead of predicting total trade ows we predict total net emigration
rates of countries.
We rst estimate the (log) stock of skilled expatriates from i living in OECD country
j in year 2000, logMij;t, as function of variables which are supposed to capture migration
costs: the total stock of emigration (sum over all education categories) in the year 1990
(in logs) migrating from country i to j, TotalMigij;t 1, countrieslog geodesic distances,
Distij, a dummy indicating whether at least 9 percent of the population in i and j speak
a common language, ComLangij, and a dummy indicating whether i and j were both
transition economies in 1990, Transitionij. The inclusion of TotalMigij;t 1 is motivated
by the notion that a larger community of people from the same nation already living
abroad create mobility-cost reducing network e¤ects, as argued by Beine, Doquier and
Ozden (2008), among others. Our indicators for geographic and linguistic proximity are
also typically used in the brain drain literature. The dummy on transition countries is
potentially important as well, since the time period we consider was shortly after the fall
of the iron curtain. This event has newly created the possibility to emigrate from a former
communist country to non-transition countries, whereas migration between communist
countries was already possible before 1990. The following equation presents the estimated
value of bilateral migration stocks with 3515 bilateral observations (standard errors in
parenthesis):
log M^ij;t =  1:407
(0:375)
+ 0:866
(0:006)
 TotalMigij;t 1   0:218
(0:021)
Distij +
0:813
(0:044)
 ComLangij   0:836
(0:092)
 Transitionij: (29)
All coe¢ cients have the expected sign and are signicantly di¤erent from zero at the
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one percent level. Moreover, the left-hand side variables explain about 92 percent of the
variation of bilateral migration stocks (R2 = 0:917).
We then recover M^ij from (29) to construct a predicted net migration rate for the year
2000, dMigj, analogously to the use of Mij to constructMigj. The correlation coe¢ cient
of the true overall net emigration rate Migj with the constructed net emigration rate,dMigj is 86 percent (see Figure A1 for a scatterplot).
In our instrumental-variable estimations we use dMigj and dDeltaMigj := dMigj;t  
Migj;t 1 instead of their actual values for estimating (27) and (28), respectively. The
key identifying assumption for a causal e¤ect of emigration on public investment is that
the instruments are uncorrelated with residuals in equations (27) and (28).
4.2 Results
Table 2 presents OLS estimates of level-regressions (27) in specications (1) to (4) and
change-regressions (28) in specications (5) to (8) using both OLS and IV. We use
the o¢ cial OECD measure for government investment (government gross xed capital
formation) in logs, PubInv, for all regressions in Table 2.
< Table 2 >
In specications (1) to (4) the coe¢ cient of interest, 1, is always negative. In
column (1), we look at the e¤ect of the net emigration rate (Mig) on public investment
in 22 OECD countries using OLS without any controls. Column (2) uses instead the
constructed net emigration rate (dMig) as an instrument for the actual net emigration
rate. The results provide no evidence that ordinary least-squares estimates overstate the
negative e¤ect on public investment. The two coe¢ cients in column (1) and column (2)
roughly have the same size. The instrument itself proves to be highly signicant when
considering the rst stage F-Test. Columns (3) and (4) represent OLS and IV regressions,
respectively, when controlling for log population size (Pop), fraction of population under
sixteen (Pop16) and (log) social expenditure per capita (SocialExp) in addition to the
net migration rate. The inuence of emigration on public investment remains negative
when the controls are added and statistical signicance increases. Quantitatively, the
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estimates suggest that e¤ects of brain drain on public investment are non-negligible.
With 1 being approximately equal to  2, an increase in the net emigration rate of one
standard deviation (equal to 0.11, according to Table 1) leads to a reduction in public
investment expenditure per capita of about 22 percent.
Turning to the estimates of change-regressions (28) conrms the results of the level-
regressions. An increase in the di¤erence of the net emigration rate between 1990 and
2000 has a negative e¤ect on the growth rate of the public investment level per capita,
where 1 is signicantly di¤erent from zero at least at the 10 percent level, according
to columns (5) to (10) in Table 2. Again, OLS- and IV-estimates are in the same
range. As expected, also the growth rate of GDP per capita (DeltaGDP ) has a positive
e¤ect. Controlling for it as well as for the growth rate of population size (DeltaPop)
reduces 1 considerably. Still, the evidence from this estimate suggests that an increase
in the change in the net migration rate over time (DeltaMig) by one standard deviation
reduces the growth rate of public investment per capita by about (0:05  1:1 =) 5:5
percentage points. Like for the level-regressions, also for the change-regressions which
give IV-estimates, in columns (6), (8) and (10) of Table 2, the F-Test shows that the
rst stage is always signicant with the proposed instrument.
< Table 3 >
In Table 3 we provide OLS and IV results of level-regressions (27) for other pub-
lic expenditure categories than government gross xed capital formation. These mea-
sure are for specications (1) to (3) total government R&D expenditure per capita
(R&DTotal), for specications (4) to (6) R&D expenditure in higher education per
capita (R&DHigherEdu), and nally for specications (7) to (9) public education ex-
penditure per capita (ExpEdu). The coe¢ cient of interest, 1, is negative and statis-
tically signicant at least at the 10 percent level for the IV-estimates. Coe¢ cients are
smaller for IV-estimates than for OLS-estimates. But the magnitude of 1 is comparable
to the estimates in Table 2, when the full set of controls is included.17
17We experimented with other public expenditure categories such as social spending, the OECD
measure for expenditure for economic a¤airs, public expenditures for housing, and total government
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< Table 4 >
Table 4 presents OLS and IV estimations of equation (28) when growth rates of the
same expenditure measures than in Table 3 are used as dependent variables. For both
R&D measures, 1 is again negative. The IV-estimates of 1 are highly signicant and
quantitatively much larger (by a factor of about four) than in the case where the growth
rate of government gross xed capital formation is the dependent variable (Table 2). For
public education expenditure, IV-estimates of 1 are not signicant but again negative
and about the same size than the OLS-estimate (which is signicant).
< Table 5 >
In Table 5 we examine whether the negative impact of higher net emigration on
public investment still holds when we employ spending as fraction of GDP rather than
per capita spending as dependent variable. This variable, however, is di¤erent to variable
G in the theoretical model. A negative impact of a higher emigration rate on the fraction
of public investment in GDP is less likely to hold than on public investment per capita,
since both G and income change in the same direction as response to migration ows,
according to the proposed theory. Nevertheless, a negative e¤ect of higher (instrumented)
net emigration on spending shares holds and is statistically signicant at least at the 10
percent level in the preferred rst di¤erence estimates, except for education expenditure.
< Table 6 >
So far we looked at the role of higher net emigration for public investments. How-
ever, it may be the case that skilled immigrants are not perfectly substitutable to skilled
emigrants and that our previous empirical results are driven by immigrants or emigrants
only. In Table 6 we report estimates which allow for a di¤erential impact of higher
immigration to higher emigration. It reveals that higher emigration has negative e¤ects
and higher immigration typically has positive e¤ects on public spending per capita, as
expenditures. These measures do not reect measures of public investment in spirit of our theory, as
they include government consumption or transfers. For these measures, e¤ects of an increase in the
net emigration rate of high-skilled labor are either insignicant (for housing and total expenditure) or
positive (for social expenditures and spending on economic a¤airs).
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expected, although coe¢ cients are not always signicant. We also see that the mag-
nitudes of the e¤ects of higher immigration are not always similar to those of higher
emigration. Nevertheless, it is not the case that the impact of a marginal increase in the
immigration rate is systematically higher or systematically lower than that of an increase
in the emigration rate.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed theoretically and empirically the relationship between migra-
tion of high-skilled individuals, income di¤erences, and di¤erences in public investment
levels across jurisdictions. According to the theoretical model, migration of skilled labor
may endogenously arise despite symmetry of jurisdictions ex ante. This possibility arises
from the assumption of human capital externalities, which imply that outows of skilled
labor reduce wage rates in source economies whereas inows raise them in destination
economies. Most importantly, the analysis suggests that higher outward migration re-
duces the impact of an increase in productivity-enhancing public expenditure on both
gross and net income levels of workers, whereas higher inward migration increases it.
Consequently, governments who care about welfare of the domestic labor force adjust
public investment levels downward when facing brain drain and upward when experienc-
ing inows of skilled labor.
We presented empirical evidence which is consistent with this main prediction of the
theory. The main innovation in the empirical part was to construct and employ an in-
strument for the net emigration rate of a country in order to establish a causal e¤ect.
We showed that an increase in the predicted net emigration rate causes quite substantial
reductions of various measures of public investment levels per capita among OECD coun-
tries. Consequently, our analysis suggests that more pronounced international migration
patterns for skilled labor are likely to aggravate di¤erences in public investment levels
across countries, along with income di¤erences.
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Figure 1 
Net emigration rates and government investment in OECD countries 
 
 
Notes: rho represents the correlation coefficient. The p-value results from a test of the significance of 
the correlation. For the construction of the net emigration rate see description in subsection 4.1. 
Government gross fixed capital formation is taken for the years 1990 and 2000 from OECD (2008).  
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Figure 2 
Migration in equilibrium for given public investment 
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Figure A1 
Actual versus constructed net emigration rate 
 
Notes: rho represents the correlation coefficient. The p-value results from a test of the significance of 
the correlation. The dotted line represents the 45-degree line.  
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 Table 1 
Data description and sources 
Variable Description and source N Mean S.D. 
Mig Net emigration rate in year 2000. See description in 
section 4.1 for construction, with data from Docquier, 
Marfouk and Lowell (2007). 
30 0.01243 0.10923 
DeltaMig Mig of year 2000 minus Mig of year 1990. 30 -0.02455 0.04885 
PubInv Log of government gross fixed capital formation per 
capita in year 2000. OECD (2008). 
22 6.506 0.57332 
DeltaPubInv PubInv in 2000 minus PubInv in 1990.  22 0.1478 0.20903 
R&DTotal Log of total government R&D expenditure per capita 
in year 2000. OECD Education Statistics Database. 
30 5.807 1.00128 
DeltaR&DTotal R&DTotal in 2000 minus by R&DTotal in 1990. 25 0.6278 0.34107 
R&DHigherEdu Log of (publicly financed) R&D expenditure in higher 
education per capita in year 2000. OECD Education 
Statistics Database. 
30 4.175 1.03412 
DeltaR&DHigherEdu R&DHigherEdu in 2000 minus R&DHigherEdu in 
1990. 
22 0.6389 0.3128 
ExpEdu Log of expenditure per capita for education in 2000. 
OECD General Government Accounts Database. 
25 7.201 0.40681 
DeltaExpEdu ExpEdu in 2000 minus by ExpEdu in 1990. 22 0.3254 0.32131 
Pop Log Population mid-year estimate in year 2000. OECD 
Population and Labor Force Statistics Database. 
30 9.617 1.55114 
DeltaPop Pop in 2000 divided by Pop in 1990. 30 1.075 0.06834 
Pop16 Population under 16 as share of whole population in 
year 2000. OECD Population and Labor Force 
Statistics Database.  
30 19.28 4.23753 
SocialExp Log of social expenditure per capita in year 2000. 
Government Regulation Size. OECD General 
Government Accounts Database. 
30 8.007 0.66004 
DeltaGDP Log real GDP in 2000 minus log real GDP in 1990. 
Penn World Tables 6.2. 
30 1.243 0.17745 
Mij Stock of emigrants of educational category “high” aged 
25+ born in country i and living in OECD country j in 
year 2000. Docquier, Marfouk and Lowell (2007). 
3560 5.296 2.70399 
TotalMigij Log size of total emigrant population from country i 
living in country j in year 1990. Docquier, Marfouk and 
Lowell (2007). 
3560 5.761 2.83947 
Distij Log geodesic distance in kms between country i and j. 
Mayer and Soledad (2006). 
3515 8.476 0.92755 
ComLangij Identifier if same language is spoken by at least 9 % of 
the population in country i and j. Mayer and Soledad 
(2006). 
3525 0.1231 0.32862 
Transitionij Dummy variable capturing if country i and j were 
economic transition countries.  
3560 0.01938 0.13788 
 
Note: The range, mean and standard deviations are based on the respective number of observations. 
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Table 2 
Effect of high-skilled net emigration rates on government gross fixed capital formation per capita: level and first difference estimates 
 
OLS 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
IV 
(8) 
OLS 
(9) 
IV 
(10) 
Dependent Variable PubInv DeltaPubInv 
(Intercept) 6.5090*** 
(0.1068) 
6.5090*** 
(0.1096) 
11.9469***
(1.5138) 
11.7402***
(1.6411) 
0.0995*** 
(0.0473) 
0.0928** 
(0.0517) 
1.1545*** 
(0.5054) 
1.0883** 
(0.5517) 
0.8836 
(0.6198) 
0.5947 
(0.5834) 
Mig -2.1590* 
(1.3304) 
-2.1860* 
(1.3910) 
-2.3280*** 
(0.8947) 
-1.9221** 
(1.0186) 
      
DeltaMig     -1.8176*** 
(0.6688) 
-2.0689** 
(1.1792) 
-1.6010*** 
(0.5312) 
-1.2474** 
(0.7370) 
-1.1536*** 
(0.5471) 
-1.1224** 
(0.5933) 
Pop   -0.1430*** 
(0.0626) 
-0.1376** 
(0.0713) 
      
Pop16   -0.0853*** 
(0.0275) 
-0.0857*** 
(0.0323) 
      
SocialExp   -0.2984*** 
(0.1094) 
-0.2782*** 
(0.1159) 
      
DeltaPop       -0.9673*** 
(0.4569) 
-0.9064** 
(0.4975) 
-1.0452*** 
(0.4588) 
-0.9427** 
(0.4700) 
DeltaGDP         0.2929 
(0.2084) 
0.4283*** 
(0.1807) 
F-value (First Stage)   59.720   22.500   31.690   15.120   20.080 
Adj. R2 0.138 0.094 0.430 0.331 0.193 0.143 0.243 0.175 0.255 0.279 
No. of obs. 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates a significance level below 5 percent; ** indicates significance level between 5 and 10 
percent; * indicates significance level between 10 and 15 percent. 
Table 3 
Effect of high-skilled net emigration rates on alternative measures of public investment per capita: level estimates 
 OLS 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
IV 
(8) 
IV 
(9) 
Dependent Variable 
R&DTotal R&DHigherEdu ExpEdu 
(Intercept) 5.8720*** 
(0.1453) 
5.8510***
(0.1662) 
4.3558 
(3.8846) 
4.2160***
(0.1819) 
4.2100***
(0.1810) 
2.0159 
(2.8938) 
7.2320***
(0.0627) 
7.2250***
(0.0715) 
3.3130***
(0.9476) 
Mig -5.2180*** 
(1.4798) 
-3.5750***
(1.6768) 
-2.6568**
(1.3257) 
-3.3570* 
(1.9897) 
-2.8640**
(1.6406) 
-2.6240** 
(1.4049) 
-2.2510***
(0.7819) 
-1.7150**
(0.9547) 
-1.5746***
(0.5154) 
Pop   -0.0962 
(0.1100) 
  0.0931 
(0.1832) 
  -0.0178 
(0.0232) 
Pop16   -0.0529 
(0.0408) 
  -0.0475 
(0.0325) 
  0.1019***
(0.0201) 
SocialExp   0.4283 
(0.3571) 
  0.2763 
(0.2937) 
  0.2769***
(0.0729) 
F-value (First Stage)   82.150 28.080   82.150 28.080   85.860 35.500 
Adj. R2 0.300 0.082 0.287 0.097 0.095 0.089 0.263 0.197 0.647 
No. of obs. 30 30 30 30 30 30 25 25 25 
 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates a significance level below 5 percent; ** indicates significance level between 5 and 10 
percent; * indicates significance level between 10 and 15 percent. 
 
f 
Table 4 
Effect of high-skilled net emigration rates on alternative measures of public investment per capita: first difference estimates 
 OLS 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
IV 
(8) 
IV 
(9) 
Dependent Variable 
DeltaR&DTotal DeltaR&DHigherEdu DeltaExpEdu 
(Intercept) 0.5486*** 
(0.0633) 
0.4980***
(0.0746) 
0.0798 
(1.3760) 
0.5883***
(0.0714) 
0.5272***
(0.0760) 
0.6478 
(1.1044) 
0.2098***
(0.0915) 
0.2062** 
(0.1149) 
-0.6920 
(0.6389) 
DeltaMig -2.8325*** 
(1.2773) 
-4.6440***
(1.8638) 
-4.7351***
(1.9600) 
-1.8954* 
(1.1400) 
-4.1850***
(1.3879) 
-4.2283*** 
(1.6199) 
-3.5534**
(1.7572) 
-3.6640 
(3.0073) 
-3.0804 
(3.1596) 
DeltaPop   0.3600 
(1.3250) 
  0.0099 
(0.9443) 
  0.0978 
(0.7957) 
DeltaGDP   0.0220 
(0.3240) 
  -0.1073 
(0.3956) 
  0.6452 
(0.4317) 
F-value (First Stage)   21.870 10.260   20.850 23.850   11.090 7.141 
Adj. R2 0.135 0.191 0.192 0.074 0.172 0.183 0.168 0.133 0.286 
No. of obs. 25 25 25 22 22 22 22 22 22 
 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates a significance level below 5 percent; ** indicates significance level between 5 and 10 
percent; * indicates significance level between 10 and 15 percent. 
 
 
g 
Table 5 
Effect of high-skilled net emigration rates on various measures of public investment spending as fraction of GDP (IV only) 
 
IV 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
IV 
(7) 
IV 
(8) 
Dependent Variable Level of Change in Level of Change in Level of Change in Level of Change in 
 PubInv-fraction R&DTotal-fraction R&DHigherEdu-fraction ExpEdu-fraction 
(Intercept) 0.0483*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.1195*** 
(0.0459) 
0.0196*** 
(0.0019) 
0.2824*** 
(0.0760) 
0.0041*** 
(0.0003) 
0.3282*** 
(0.0733) 
0.0609*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0056 
(0.1083) 
Mig -0.0493* 
(0.0308) 
 -0.0247* 
(0.0169) 
 -0.0063*** 
(0.0030) 
 -0.0087 
(0.0206) 
 
DeltaMig  -1.8268** 
(0.9292) 
 -4.3592** 
(2.1723) 
 -3.9369*** 
(1.5645) 
 -3.0307 
(2.6202) 
F-value (First Stage) 85.860 31.690 82.150 21.870 82.150 20.850 85.860 11.090 
Adj. R2 0.138 0.124 0.151 0.177 0.058 0.175 0.040 0.031 
No. of obs. 25 22 30 25 30 22 25 22 
 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *** indicates a significance level below 5 percent; ** indicates significance level between 5 and 10 
percent; * indicates significance level between 10 and 15 percent. 
 
h 
Table 6 
Effect of gross high skilled immigration and emigration rates on public investment and changes in public investment (IV only) 
 
IV 
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
IV 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
IV 
(7) 
IV 
(8) 
Dependent Variable PubInv R&DTotal R&D HigherEdu ExpEdu DeltaPubInv 
DeltaR&D 
Total 
DeltaR&D 
HigherEdu 
DeltaExp 
Edu 
(Intercept) 11.2170*** 
(1.8787) 
3.5810 
(4.2946) 
-0.0950 
(2.9806) 
2.9743*** 
(0.9215) 
0.8044 
(0.7416) 
-0.3232 
(1.5287) 
0.0275 
(1.1887) 
-0.8312* 
(0.4908) 
Immig 1.5195** 
(0.7577) 
2.4075** 
(1.4340) 
3.8819*** 
(1.4295) 
1.6850*** 
(0.5687)         
Emig -0.9996* 
(0.6253) 
-1.4683* 
(1.0085) 
-0.2527 
(1.2706) 
-1.0066*** 
(0.4313)         
DeltaImmig 
        
0.3585* 
(0.2358) 
0.1860 
(0.1953) 
0.8896* 
(0.5628) 
0.2685 
(0.2363) 
DeltaEmig 
        
-0.1088* 
(0.0580) 
-0.3511* 
(0.2282) 
-0.4791 
(0.6043) 
-0.7717* 
(0.4567) 
Pop -0.1148 
(0.0897) 
-0.0640 
(0.1206) 
0.2193 
(0.2131) 
0.0004 
(0.0282)         
Pop16 -0.0889*** 
(0.0350) 
-0.0557 
(0.0405) 
-0.0628** 
(0.0327) 
0.0979*** 
(0.0201)         
SocialExp -0.2421** 
(0.1273) 
0.4768 
(0.3787) 
0.3617 
(0.2922) 
0.2958*** 
(0.0762)         
DeltaPop 
        
-1.4834*** 
(0.7012) 
0.6219 
(1.6578) 
0.0620 
(1.2381) 
-0.3171 
(0.4144) 
DeltaGDeP 
        
0.7657*** 
(0.2018) 
0.2269 
(0.4289) 
0.4594 
(0.4807) 
1.1754*** 
(0.2233) 
F-value First Stage (Delta)Immig 24.740 33.980 33.980 23.750 26.590 26.640 45.560 18.580 
F-value First Stage (Delta)Emig  46.820 53.370 53.370 81.540 42.080 12.430 18.730 19.370 
Adj. R2 0.249 0.247 0.123 0.618 0.273 0.051 0.082 0.245 
No. of obs. 22 30 30 25 22 25 22 22 
 
Notes: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. Immig stands for the immigration rate of high skilled and Emig denotes the emigration rate of high 
skilled. DeltaImmig and DeltaEmig represent changes of immigration and emigration rates from 1990 to 2000 respectively. *** indicates a significance level 
below 5 percent; ** indicates significance level between 5 and 10 percent; * indicates significance level between 10 and 15 percent. 
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